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are to the following works: 
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Epicurus. Letter to Herodotus 
Furley, David. Two Studies in the Greek Atomists 
Guthrie, W.K.C. A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. II 
Lucretius. De Rerum Natura 
I. 
That it is difficult to reconstruct an accurate picture of the composition and 
functioning of the Epicurean psyche from the extant original fragments has long been re­
congnized by scholars. When we speak of "Epicurean" psychology, we must be careful to 
distinguish between what theories Epicurus himself held, and what views were elaborated 
by later members of the school, as it is probable that his later followers assimilated 
either consciously or inadvertently teachings from other philosphical schools and tradi­
tions into their own thinking. Of course, there is the persistent claim which the later 
Epicureans never tired of making, viz. that what they wrote was authentic doctrine or at 
most an accurate extension of the master's philosophy. Comparing this contention to that 
of another tradition, we have the strong insistence of Plotinus that at no point does he 
deviate from the teaching of Plato, a claim which we now know to be inaccurate. The Ryth­
agoreans likewise disclaimed any deviation from the thought of Pythagoras. It was, after 
all, characteristic of many ancient writers to pass off their ideas as the exegesis and 
further development, if not the literal duplication, of the works of older masters. 
In the light of such well-known claims, it is difficult to understand why so many 
Epicurean scholars have accepted without question the pronouncements of later members of 
the Epicurean tradition as being faithful to the thought of Epicurus. Both of the scholars 
whose interpretations are discussed in this paper make this assumption. David Furley ac­
cepts without demur the ideas of Lucretius as being "Epicurean," and Cyril Bailey states 
the point explicitly. In discussing whether Lucretius' conception of the psyche is faith-'­
ful to Epicurus, Bailey says: "It is highly improbable that Lucretius, who in all parts of 
the poem is so scrupulous in following his master's lead in every detail, has here gratu'."" 
itously amplified him" (p. 388-89). Earlier in the same work he says that "it is fine tes­
timony to the permanence of the Epicurean tradition that Lucretius, even though his expli­
cit references to the Canonice are but few and casual, yet observes it is practice as scrup­
ulously as his Master" (p. 236). It is difficult to understand how he knows this, espec­
ially as he has just told us that the Canonice is lost. 
The intrusion of non-Epicurean elements into the doctrines of later Epicureans is 
indeed a vast topic and should be of concern to the historians of philosophy. However, it 
is not the purpose of this paper to trace the story of later addenda to the original philos­
ophy of the founder of the Epicurean tradition, nor is it to identify the sequence of phases 
by which doctrinal changes were made through the absorption of elements which seem to be 
supportive of or akin to the views which made up the Epicurean theory of the soul. Rather, 
my purpose is to examine the interpretations advanced by these two scholars who seem con­
vinced that there is no substantive difference between Epicurus' doctrine of the psyche and 
that held by Lucretius, and test Lucretius' theory against the extant fragments of Epicurus. 
I think it can be shown that 1) there are certain features of Lucretius' account of the 
psyche which were neither parts of Epicurus' doctrine-nor necessary to account for the ori­
ginal atomic theory of the soul; 2) Epicurus' theory is more complete than has previously 
been believed to be the case; and 3) whatever the case with Epicurus an.d Lucretius, the 
positions of the two scholars in question are no� clear or consistent. 
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5. Compounds ,ftlso have symptomata cruµiti:wµai:a , occasional properties (Letter to Herodo­
tus, 70). These properties are particular instances of variations in the symbebekota 
or constant accompanying properties. For instance, this rather than that shade of 
color, though both shades may be had at different ti� Another example would be 
that from acquired states, like being rich now and poor at another time, free now but 
a slave later, asleep now but awake later, at war now but at peace later. Another 
example yet may be had with reference to diverse qualities: hardness, softness, and 
so on. 
6. Epicurus argues against hypostatizing, i.e. making ontically ultimate, any of the 
symbebekota (68). Here he is close to Aristotle. 
7. The soul is corporeal and consists of atoms. But what kind of atoms compose the psyche? 
If Diogenes Laertius is to be trusted, Epicurus believed the psyche to be composed of 
fine, smooth, spherical atoms, which have remarkable mobility. The body, he says, is 
a vessel for the soul and is needed for sensation. (D.L.10.66). 
8. Diogenes also says that body and soul come into existence simultaneously. Though the 
body does not possess all the capacities of the soul, like memory, intelligence, and 
reason, it shares in the five senses and can share passively in the feelings of the 
soul through sympatheia. The soul is dispersed over the whole organism (D.L.10.63; 
10.64-end). 
All of the above information (with the exception of the last two items) is from 
the Letter to Herodotus. Restricting ourselves to this information, what conclusions can 
we draw about the Epicurean psyche? It is, I think, helpful to look at the problem from a 
common-sense perspective. Here before us we have a living human body. What makes it ani­
mate? The two most obvious characteristics of a living body are that it is warm and breath­
ing, whereas a dead body is cold and does not breathe. So, in the Letter to Herodotus, which 
is after all a sumrua:t:y of Epicurean philosophy, Epicurus says that the psyche is similar in 
some respects to breath and heat. (It is significant that he does not mention air, which is 
probably a later addition.) Why is the animate body breathing and warm? Because it has 
spread throughout it a certain number of psyche-atoms. The same body without these atoms 
would be cold and unbreathing. 
The psyche, then, seems to be some kind of compound, as it (or it in conjunction with 
a human body), has certain properties which do not belong to atoms in isolation, such as 
heat and breath. On further reflection, we realize that an animate human being also has sen­
sation, memory, the ability to reason, etc. These are also, like heat and br�ath, either 
symbebekota or symptomata of the psyche. (Although it would seem that sensation would be a 
symbebekos of the psyche, at 64 Epicurus says that it is a symptoma of both the psyche and 
the body.) If heat, breath, sensation, memory, and reason are indeed either symbebekota or 
svmptomata of the psyche, as common sense suggests, this means that (a) they cannot exist 
alone, i.e. they are not themselves kinds of atoms or compounds, and (b) that they are 
properties of compound entities and not of atoms themselves (which, we are told, have only 
size, shape, and weight). 
What kind of compound is the psyche? Is it an aggregate &�po�oµa or a system 
crucri:nµa ? This is difficult to determine. On the one hand, Epicurus says that the psyche 
atoms are "sown" throughout the body, which suggests that there is a loose connection between 
them. On the other hand, if Diogenes is correct, there are some functions which are common 
to the whole animated body, such as sensation, but others which can be attributed to the 
psyche alone, such as reason and memory, which would suggest that the psyche is a system with 
its own special properties. However, this point is not too important, as Epicurus uses the 
words aggregate and system rather loosely. For example, in the passage on the composition 
of the psyche he refers to the human body as a whole as both a system or organism and an 
aggregate. 
With this understanding of the constitution of the psyche, we can now proceed to ex­
amine and evaluate the views of two scholars who see no significant differences in the psychol­
ogies of Epicurus and Lucretius. 
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III. 
David Furley translates the crucial passage from Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus as 
follows: 
The psyche is corporeal, of fine texture, distributed over the whole frame, most 
similar to pnel!_ma with an admixture of heat, being like the former is one way and 
the latter in another; in addition there is the part greatly exceeding even these 
in fineness of texture and by virtue of this being the more closely associated in 
feeling with the rest of the frame (p.196). 
From this Furley concludes: 
This carefully qualified summary mentions only three constituents -- something 
like pneuma, heat, and something finer than these. Later doxographers and Epicurus' 
own disciple Lucretius, raise the number to four (p.196). 
Now it seems that Furley's translation is not so very different from my own, since 
he says of psyche and its resemblance to heat and pneuma that it is "like the former in one 
way and the latter in another� i.e. bears some resemblance to both. However, in his commen­
tary on the passage he draws the conclusion that there are three different constituents of 
the psyche: (1) something like pneuma; (2) anQther. something like heat, and (3) some­
thing finer than these. He then goes on to accept the testimony of Lucretius, supported by 
Aetius and Plutarch, that the "Epicurean" psyche is composed 't£. four constituents: vapor 
(something hot), aura (pneuma) air, and a fourth unnamed kind. 
Furley then proceeds to say: "The proportions of at least three of the four kinds 
may vary from one psyche to another; we have the authority of Lucretius for this." (p.197). 
He then quotes a long passage from Lucretius (3.294-397), which suggests in rather poetic 
terms that differences in temperament among human beings can be accounted for on the basis 
of the varying proportions of the four elements in the psyche. For example, passionate men 
have more of the "hot element" in their psyches. 
There is more of the hot element in those whose bitter heart and wrathful mind 
easily explodes in anger. In this class above all is the forceful, vio:Jent lion, 
who bursts his breast with noise when he roars and can't contain the waves of 
anger in his breast. The chilly mind of deer is more full of breath and wafts 
cool breezes through their bodies, which impart a trembling movement to their 
limbs. The species of cattle lives more on air, which is placid; anger's firebrand 
is never much charged to stir them smokily, filling them with the darkness of 
blind fog, nor do they cower transfixed by the chilly arrows of fear; they are 
betwixt and between the deer and the fierce lions. So it is with the race of men.� 
Furley comments on this passage from Lucretius as follows: 
It will be seen at once that this is a perilous doctrine for an Epicurean to hold. 
For it seems to entail that a man's character and his reactions to the world will 
be determined at his birth by the proportions of pneuma, heat, and air in his soul. 
If this is the case, there is no hope of success in the ultimate aim of the Epicur­
ean philosophy -- to teach men tranquillity. We are tranqul, if it is our nature 
to be; if not, not. (p.198) 
I find the following difficulties in Furley's position. 
1. Furley speaks of "the proport:;i..ons of pneuma, heat, and air in his soul." He has 
switched from saying on. p.196 that the constituents of the soul are something like 
air, something like heat, etc., to saying that the constituents of the soul are in 
fact air, heat, etc. In other words, he has switched from resemblance to identity. 
2. How can "heat" itself be a constituent of the soul? I see no evidence that Epicurus 
considered heat or breath to be either a compound or a kind of atom. Heat is an 
epiphenomenon, one of the symbebekota which are not really in the atom. 
3. Diogenes Laertius does not suggest that there are four different constituents in the 
psyche, and it seems to me that his testimony is usually more reliable than that of 
either Aetius or Plutarch. Plutarch is frequently unfair and inaccurate in discus-
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sing thinkers with whom he disagrees, and he takes a decidedly polemical stance 
against Epicurus ( KwA.wT� 6E: yEA.oi:ov 001!£1: • • •  ) • 
Just the same, Furley, Bailey, and others'*"make special efforts to accomodate these 
ancient testimonies, probably because they are closer to Lucretius' addenda. 
4. He infers from the Lucretius passage that according to "Epicurean" psychology there 
are different proportions of the four kinds in different people • .  Does "Epicurean" 
mean "Lucretian" (as it should, since the theory is based solely on a passage from 
Lucretius), or is it also intended to include Epicurus? In a later summary of "Epi­
curean" psychology it becomes evident that he means to include this as genuinely 
Epicurean: "Each person is born with a psyche of a particular character, determined 
by the proportions of atoms of the four different kinds which constitute a psyche" 
(p.233). 
5. One of the problems with which Furley is concerned throughout the second part of his 
book, "Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary Action", is the difficulty which he states 
in his commentary on the passage from Lucretius, viz. how to hold a person responsible 
for his character if this is determined at birth by "the proportions of pneuma, heat 
and air in his soul." After a discussion of this problem, he concludes that: "The 
character of the person is to some extent still determined by the initial constitu­
tion of his psyche, because the proportions of atoms of different types in it remain 
the same. But to a much greater extent his character is adaptable, because the 
motions of the atoms are not determined and can be changed by learning" (234). It 
seems to me that much of the difficulty Furley has in attempting to reconcile volun­
tary action and the formation of character with the pre-determination caused by the 
proportions of pneuma, heat and air in the soul is simply eliminated, for Epicurus 
at least, if this theory is seen to be Lucretian and not Epicurean. The central point 
which Furley attempts to establish in his second study is that Epicurus' theory of 
voluntary action was developed in response to Aristotle. But in his formulation of 
Epicurus' theory, he consistently brings in Lucretius. 
6. Finally, Furley sometimes says that the psyche is composed of four different kinds 
of atoms, as when he says of the psyche that "the proportions of atoms of different 
types in it remain the same'' (p.234). However, he sometimes says, or at least seems 
to suggest, that the constituents of the psyche are not different kinds of atoms, but 
the compounds pneuma, heat, and air. He says that according to Lucretius and Epicur­
us one of the constituents of the psyche is "vapor (which seems to mean something hot)" 
(p.196). If one of the constituents of the psyche is "something hot", this constitu­
ent cannot be a kind of atom, as atoms have only size, shape, and weight. Only a 
compound can have the characteristic of being hot. He also says that to a certain 
extent one's character is determined at birth "by the proportions of pneuma, heat and 
air in his soul" (p.198). This suggests a kind of complex entity, not a kind of atom. 
Whatever position Furley means to take on this issue, it seems to me that Lucretius 
considered the ultimate constituents of the psyche to be more complex entities than 
atoms. Let us look briefly at the evidence. 
Lucretius' contention that the soul is composed of particles of heat, breath, air and 
a fourth unnamed constituent, could mean one of two things, one of which is not suggested by 
Epicurus and the other of which is incompatible with Epicurus' philosophy. Lucretius could 
mean that there are four kinds of atoms in the psyche, and that these are atoms which, if 
combined in sufficient numbers, would produce heat, breath, and air. This is not suggested 
by the Letter to Herodotus passage, which says that the soul is like a blend of heat and 
breath and that it in some way resembles heat and it in some way resembles breath. I do not 
think that Epicurus regarded heat and breath as either kinds of atoms or as compound entities 
of any kind, but as properties of compounds, and he does not mention "air" in his summary at 
all. On the other hand, Lucretius could mean that the air, breath, and heat which go into 
the psyche are entities more complex than atoms, and already possess some properties which are 
not possessed by atoms, such as being hot. This clearly seems to be implied in his position 
that passionate people have more of the hot element in their psyches. If this is his position, 
it revises substantially Epicurus' theory of ultimate atoms, making the soul a compo.11,1d composed 
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of other compounds. Lucretius consistently seems to ascribe to the components of the soul 
the properties of compounds. In discussing the composition of the psyche, he says that 
breath, mingled with heat, forsakes the bodies of dying men; and this heat draws 
the air along with it, for there can be no heat without air intermixed, and heat 5 being in its nature rare, must have some seeds of air united with it (iii.234-237). 
He concludes from this that the components of the soul� heat, breath, and air (not atoms 
which, if combined in sufficient quantities, would produce these), and goes on to name a 
fourth even finer constituent which accounts for sensation and thought. 
The word which Lucretius uses most frequently to refer to the constituents of the 
psyche is "seeds" (semina). Although he sometimes refers to atoms as semina, as in 2.730-841 
where he argues that the atoms themselves are colorless, he usually seems to have in mind by 
this word something more complex than an atom. He often uses it to refer to living organisms, 
as at the end of Book IV (4.1036-1277). He also referes to "seeds of fire" (6.160, 200, 213, 
217), "seeds of heat" (6.271, 275, 883), and "seeds of water" (6.497, 517, 520), apparently 
meaning by such phrases a compound of some sort rather than an atom. 
Perhaps one could say that the original or ultimate constituents of the psyche are 
atoms of four kinds. These combine to produce compounds which are hot, etc., and these com­
pounds are in turn parts of the psyche. I cannot see that allowing for such intermediate 
stages in the formation of the psyche helps the situation. The psyche is still a compound 
composed of other compounds; the problem has simply been removed by one or more stages. 
The only way in which it might be acceptable to say that the psyche is composed of 
four kinds of atoms would be to say that when these atoms hook together to form a psyche, 
they produce a different kind of compound than they would have produced had they made air, 
heat, and breath. Kerferd makes a suggestion similar to this when he interprets Epicurus' 
psyche as a xpaµa According to Alexander of Aphrodisias De Mixtione 214.28-215.8 Bruns= 
fr. 290 Us, Epicurus supposed "that in xpaot.� the separate substances were fist broken up 
into their constituent atoms which were then re-combined. So it was not so much a combina­
tion of two or more substances as a new combination of substance-forming atoms." b Kerferd 
then interprets Lucretius' concept of the psyche to be "not a mixture of four 
substances by juxtaposition, but a true Epicurean xpaµa • " 1 This, he believes, explains 
the reference to semina in III. 127-8. I am not sure that we can accept this solution. It 
is, after all, an interpretation, based on nothing in either Epicurus or Lucretius. Lucre-
tius does not suggest that the soul is a xpaµa (or any Latin equivalent), and he clearly 
seems to attribute to the constituents of the psyche the properties of different kinds of 
compounds. Nowhere does he suggest that the compounds composing the psyche are broken down 
and re-combined as something different. 
IV. 
After stating Lucretius' position on the composition of the psyche, Cyril Bailey says: 
"Two questions suggest themselves: Ls this a spontaneous addition to Epicurus' theory.made 
by Lucretius on his own authority, and whether this is so or not, what is the significance of 
the addition?" p.388). In response to the first question, he innnediately concludes that he 
does not think Lucretius has "gratuitously amplified" his master. Like Furley, he appeals 
to Aetius and Plutarch for additional support for the contention that Epucurus held the soul 
to be a compound of four constituents, an element like heat, one like air, one like breath or 
wind, and a fourth nameless element (Connnentary on Lucretius' De �m Natura, vol. II. p.1026; 
also Epicurus, p.226). In his connnentary on the Letter to Herodotus Bailey is careful to 
distinguish between Lucretius and Epicurus: "Lucretius says straightforwardly that it �he 
psychi} is air and wind and heat: Epicurus more guardedly that it is 'most like' breath and 
heat" (p.388, 390; also Epicurus p.227). However, he does not consistently maintain t_his 
difference (See p.387). 
Bailey believes that Epicurus' view of the psyche is a refinement of Democritus' 
identification of the soul with fire. "Democritus inherited from Leucippus the general con­
ception that the soul (psyche) or vital principle was corporeal, that it was of the nature 
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of fire and was, like fire, composed of spherical atoms, for they were the most mobile. These 
ideas Democritus retained unmodified." (p.156). But it is not at all clear that Democritus 
identified the soul with fire; what he says, or seems to suggest, is that the soul, like fire, 
is composed of spherical particles. In support of Democritus' identification of soul with 
fire, Bailey quotes Diogenes Laertieus ix.44 on Democritus: "The sun and moon are composed 
of smooth and spehrical particles, and likewise the soul." Commenting on this, Bailey says: 
"The soul that is, is fiery in its nature, therefore it must be composed of the same kind of 
particles as the fiery heavenly bodies: the presence of the spherical particles give to both 
therir characteristics." (p.156). This, although correct, does not identify soul with fire, 
but says merely that they are both composed of similar spherical atoms. 
Bailey also quotes Aristotle's de Anima A. 2. 405a5, in .support of his claim that Demo­
critus identified the soul with fire: "Some have thought the soul is fire: for fire too has 
finest parts and is the most bodiless acrwµcnov of all the elements and more than anything 
else is moved and moves other things." I have difficuluty understanding how Bailey can ex­
tract from the de Anima passage the inference that Aristotle connects Democritus with those 
who thought that the soul is fire, as the text doesn't permit this inference. in fact, what 
Aristotle does in the sentence immediately following A.2.405a5 is to contrast Democritus with 
those who associated soul with fire, although both he and those who identified the soul with 
fire addressed themselves to the same problem, viz. how "the soul moves and is a primary cause 
of movement in other things." Aristotle says that "Democritus has explained with greater 
precision why each of these two things is so, for he identifies the soul with the mind." 
• 
' \ "  T ' '  \ 
�nµoMpLTos • • • • uxnv µEv yap ELVaL TauTo MaL voav • • •  
Hence de Anima A.2.405a5 offers no support to the inference that Aristotle classified Democri­
tur among those who taught that the soul is fire. 
W. K. C. Guthrie, in discussing whether or not Democritus identified the soul with 
fire, quotes a much stronger passage from Aristotle: "This Lthe theory that soul is self­
moving and the origin of movement in other thingi) is what led Democritus to say that soul 
is a sort of fire or hot substance; his 'forms' or atoms are infinite in number; those which 
are spherical he calls fire and soul." (de Anima 404al-2.) 
�nµoMPLTos µ'E:v itOp n Mat �Epµov �oi:VCiUtnv · Elvav aitECpwv y?tp ovtwv crxnvcfrwv 
' ' , _, ' - ' ' .# . MaL atoµwv ta cr�aLpOELOn itOp MaL •uxnv A€Y€L • • •  
Even this passage does not suggest a sequence in composition from spherical atoms to fire 
and from fiery body to soul. All it establishes is that fire and soul resemble each other, 
and are both composed of spherical atoms. Guthrie goes on to raise the question: "Did Demo­
critus actually identify soul with fire?" (p.43lff.) He believes that "the question is not 
altogether simple." Guthrie does think that Aristotle inferred the identity of soul and fire, 
but as I have indicated I am not sure that Aristotle did so unqualifiedly. Guthrie, anyway, 
does not give a concrete answer to this question. He merely says that "all previous and con­
temporary thought would influence Democritus towards associating life with heat, and all au­
thorities agree that he did so." (p.432). This latter statement is correct and puts the Demo­
critean view in the right perspective. 
To return to Bailey: · he states that Epicurus preserves this idea (i.e. Democritus' 
view that the soul is fire), "but it is not by itself sufficiently subtle for him" (p. 387), 
so he added three other elements. I cannot see thatBailey is on good grounds for attributing 
to Epicurus a further refinement of Democritus' view, especially since it cannot be concus­
ively established that Democritus actually identified the soul with fire. But to prove his 
point, Bailey quotes Epicurues' definition of soul: "a body of fine particles • • •  most resemb­
ling breath with a certain admixture of heat and in some parts like to one of these and in 
some to the other" (387-388). 
The most perplexing statement comes directly after the quotation: "Heat is thus re­
tained as a constituent element, but to it is now added the element of breath or wind (pneuma)� 
The difficulty lies with the introduction of the expression "constituent element." For we do 
not know how "heat" is an element, or "breath" for that matter. To ascribe to them some tech­
nical meaning in Epicurus' ontology would not be too difficult, but to.call them "constituent 
elements" of psyche is to revise substantially the theory of ultimate atoms. Heat and breath 
are properties of compounds, and air is as much composite as soul. Now, to take properties 
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of fire or soul compounds such as heat and make these properties constituent elements of 
soul-compounds, is to derive somehow soul compounds not solely from spherical atoms but from 
spherical atoms, other compounds such 1as air, and properties emerging with compounds, such as 
heat. Soul is then a compound composed of other compounds and properties arising from com­
pounds. What is, then, a case of resemblance is turned into one of derivation. I do not 
think there is any support for this in Epicurus. 
Bailey says repeatedly that the soul is actually composed of heat, breath, and air 
(p.388,390; also Epicurus,p.227). That he maintained this position is obvious, for example, 
in his discussion of the difference between air and breath. Following Giussani, Bailey says 
that according to Epicurus heat, wind, and air are three different substances, each with a 
different temperatu�e. Heat is hot, wind or breath is cold, and air has a temperature some­
where between that of the other two. Bailey goes on to say that Epicurus accounts for differ­
ent levels of heat and cold in the psyche by having it composed of three constituent elements, 
each with a different temperature: "The three elements in the soul then represent, as Gius­
sani thinks, three distinct temperatures, 'air,' the normal temperature of the atmosphere, 
'heat' 'a temperature above normal, and 'wind' below normal" (p.389). It is clear from this 
that Bailey believes the constituents of the soul to be themselves compounds, as he ascribes 
to them heat, coldness, and a temperature between the other two. He also uses the word "sub­
stances" to apply to the constituents of the psyche. Although he does not tell us exactly 
how he uses this word, a "substance" is obviously something more complex than an atom. 
His position on the composition of the psyche is stated very explicitly when Bailey 
writes: "The soul is composed of the four elements: of what character will its component 
atoms be?" (p.395). This makes it clear that when he uses such terms as "substance" and 
"element" to apply to the constituents of the psyche, he is not using them as synonyms for 
"atom". What precisely does he mean by referring to the constituents of the psyche as "ele­
ments"? If the term "element" (stoicheion) is employed in any technical sense, it should not 
be used to refer to heat, air, etc.S If "element" means some kind of ultimate constituent, 
then the "elements' for Epicurus are atoms. It seems to me that too much has been made of 
this theory of "constituent elements of the soul," and much confusion results form switching 
back and forth from "constituent elements" to "component atoms" and other similar expressions. 
v. 
I do not wish to maintain that the composition of the Epicurean psyche is a simple 
problem. What kind of compound entity the soul is, and all of the problems resulting from its 
union with the rest of the human organism, make the question a complex one indeed. However, I 
do not think that the .scholars under consideration have really clarified the issue. Both 
Furley and Bailey refer indiscriminately to the component parts of the psyche as "constituents'; 
"elements," and "atoms." Bailey also uses the words "particles" and "substances." Perhaps 
these words could all be used in a non-technical sense to mean loosely "component," or as syn­
onymous with "atom." However, this is clearly not the case for Bailey, who as we have seen 
distinguishes the "elements" of the psyche from its "atoms." I cannot make any sense of this 
in an Epicurean context. 
Both Bailey and Furley say alternately that: 
1. Soul is like pneuma, etc. (Furley, p.196; Bailey, 388, 390; Epicurus, p. 227). 
2� Soul has as its ultimate components air-atoms, pneuma-atoms, etc. (Furley, p. 196,234; 
Bailey, p. 395, 581). 
3. Soul has as its ultimate components heat-compound, air-compound, etc. , which makes the 
soul a compound composed of other compounds and substantially revises the Epicurean 
theory of ultimate atoms. (Furley, p. 197; Bailey, p. 388). 
Neither explains what kind of entity the psyche is. Are we to think of it as four separate 
substances, which are somehow collectively called a psyche? Are these four substances some­
how united to produce a single entity, a psyche? If so, how? 
In conclusion, I have tried in this paper to establish the following differences 
between the Epicurean and Lucretian psyches: 
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